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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
.\ll~RLE HINDS COMPANY, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TILE INDl"S'l_'lUAL COM~IlSSION 
OF F'l1 AU, UNITED STATES FI-
DELl'rY AND GUARANTY COM-
PANY, PHILIP M. RALEIGH 
COl\lPANY AND HAROLD BA W-
DEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
10891 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-HAROLD BAWDEN 
APPEAL FROM THE 
lNDVS'l'RIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a claim before the Industrial Commission of 
the State of Utah for disability by reason of an accident 
arising out of or in the course of employment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION 
The matter was heard by the Industrial Commission 
and referred to a Medical Panel. The Industrial Com-
mission made its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Award on February 16, 1967, which Award was 
favorable to Applicant, Harold Bawden. 
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RELIEF SOGGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff Merle Hinds, lnc., seeks rnv\~rnal of thP 
Industrial Commission's Award. 
STATEMEN'l' OF FAC'l'S 
Defendant, Harold Bawden, disagrees with plain-
tiff's statement of the facts, in that they are stated a1:1 
the appellant contends them to be, not stated, as they 
must be on appeal, favorable to the award of the Indus-
trial Conunission. 
Harold Bawden was employed by defendant, :Merle 
Hinds Company, lnc., as a salesman in September of 
1962. (R. 28). His job as a sale:::;man was to solicit ordern 
from bakers, candy makers, ice cream makers, clubs and 
grocery 8tores. (R. 28-29). He was not furnished a car, 
but used his own. (R. 29). He worked on a commission 
basis, and was paid $2,984.41, in 19G3, and $3,688.98, in 
1964. (R. 33). His average weekly earnings in 1963 
were between $69.72 and $78.00. (R. 33). Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield insumnce coverage was furnished and 
paid for by Merle Hinds Company, lnc., for all of their 
employees. (R. 67). Further, United Commercial Trav-
elers' Insurance Company also provided coverage for 
all of the employees of Merle Hinds Company, Inc., al-
though the employees paid the premium on these policies. 
(R. 71-72). The Company continued to pay the Blue 
Cross - Blue Shield premiums for its employees until 
July of 1965. (R. 73). l\Ir. Bawden was covered under 
both coverages. (R. 71, R. 74). 
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Although Mr. Bawden indicated he was not em-
ployed to do other things, (R. W), on the day in ques-
tion, April 30, 19G5, he checked into the warehouse and 
was helping driver, Gary Scott, get his load onto the 
dock and into his truck. (R. !29). 
l\lr. Bawden needed some merchandise to fill an or-
der, and went back into the warehouse to get the mer-
chandise. (R. 30). \Vhile standing in front of the stacked 
ca:;es of merdiandi:;e, Mr. Bawden, in checking off his 
list of merchandise, gradually a:;:;urned a squatting po-
sition. He was bent over very far, with his head pro-
truding quite far to see what was on the label of the 
bottom case. While in the bottom position he felt pain 
in his knee. (R. 30). He was working in a space some-
what less than three feet wide and demonstrated the 
position to the hearing examiner. (R. 31). 
He couldn't straighten his leg out, but with the 
assi:;tance of a broomstick, a:; a cane, he had the mer-
chandise loaded into hi:; wagon, and made delivery of 
the merchandise. (R. 31). Several other employees of 
the Merle Hinds Company, Inc., were cognizant of the 
fact that Mr. Bawden received the injury. (R. 32-35 ). 
l\lr. Sm•dden himself indicates that it occurred exactly 
a:; Mr. Bawden testified. (R. 7-!). 
Following the delivery of the merchandise, l\Ir. Baw-
den went to the l\Iemorial Medical Clinic in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, and was seen by Dr. '\V allace V. Jenkins on 
April 30, 19G5. (R. 34). His right knt>e was x-rayed at 
this time. (R. S, top of pagP). l\rr. Bawden was treated 
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by Dr. Jenkins and ref erred to Dr. Sam Taylor for 
surgery. (R. 34). He was seen by Dr. Taylor on 1\lay 
4, 1965, and reported to the L.D.S. Hospital for smg<'l'Y 
on May 9, 1965. (R. 35). 
Prior to the hospitalization, l\lerle Hinds Compan~·, 
Company, Inc., learned that its vVorkmen's Compensa-
tion Insurance with U.S.F.&G. inadvertently had not 
been renewed on May 1, 1964 and was not in force on 
April 30, 1965. (R. 24, R. 37-38, R. 41, R. 69). Mr. Sned-
den then requested 1\lr. Bawden to re1rnrt the a!'ci<l<'nt 
under the Blue Cross - Blue Shield coverage, (R 7-±-
75 ), which 1\fr. Bawden did. (R. 37-38). 
Mr. Bawden was released from the L. D. S. Hospital 
on 1\fay 16, 1965. (R. 36). He \Vas re-hospitalized from 
May 19, 1965, to July 21, 1965, for complications result-
ing from the surgery. (R. 164). He was not able to 
return to work until June 6, 1966. (R. 162, R. 168). 
Mr. Bawden filed a claim with the Industrial Com-
mission on October 21, 1965, against Merle Hinds Com-
pany, Inc. (R. 9). Liability was denied by 1\lerle Hinds 
Company, Inc., on January 17, 1966, on the basis of no 
accident on the premises in the course of employment. 
(R. 13). Claim was also made by defendant for coverage 
by United States Fidelity and Guaranty for lack of 
coverage because of negligence on the part of the insur-
ance agent, Phillip M. Raleigh Company. (R. 13). United 
States Fidelity and Guaranty Company and Phillip :M. 
Raleigh Company were named defendants in the Notice 
of Hearing of the claim. (R. 16). 
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Hearing was had on l\fay 11, 19G6, at the conclusion 
of which, applicant was referred to a medical panel. 
(R. 100). 
'l'he medical panel filed its report on October 27, 
19GG, ( R. 160), and the report was mailed to all parties 
and their attorneys on October 27, 1966. No objections 
were filed to the report of the panel and the commission 
deemed it admitted in evidence. 
The hearing examiner filed his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and award which were passed and 
approved by the Industrial Commission of Utah on Feb-
ruary 16, 1967. (R. 167-168). Defendant Merle Hinds 
· Company, Inc., filed a petition for review on March 1, 
1967, alleging there was no accident and requesting fur-
ther hearing, (R. 171-172), which petition was denied by 
the Commission on March 16, 1967. (R. 172-A). Defend-
ant filed a second Petition for Review on March 29, 1967, 
(R. 173-179) ), raising a new question of an independent 
contractor relationship. This was denied by the Com-
mission on April 6, 1967. (R. 180). Merle Hinds Com-
pany, Inc., then filed its Petition for a Writ of Review 
in this Court on April 12, 1967, (R. 181-186). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND 
THAT APPLICANT SUFFERED AN INJURY BY ACCIDENT 
ARISING OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOY-
MENT. 
:Section 35-1--15, U.C.A. 1953, in essence provides: 
•'Every ernployee ... who is injured, ... by acci-
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dent arising out of or in the course of his em1Jloy-
ment, wheresoever such injury OC{'lllTed, ... "'hall 
be entitled to receive, ... compem;ation for los1:> 
sustained on account of such injury." 
A hearing was had, after notice, on May 1, 1966, 
concerning the occurrence of the accident. Collateral 
matters, including vVorkmen's Compensation COVPrage, 
or the lack thereof and the reasons why, occupit>d tlw 
majority of the time in the hearing. 
Harold Bawden testified as to the onset of the 
injury on April 30, 1965. That an injury occurred on 
April 30, 1965, there can he no doubt. Mr. Snedden him-
self indicated that the injury occurred t>xactly as Mr. 
Bawden testified, (R. 74): 
"Mr. Hurley: Now did you learn that l\lr. 
Bawden had suffered an injury on April 30, 1965, 
did you not? 
Mr. Snedden: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Hurley: And that lllJury occurred, to 
the best of your knowledge, in the manner l\ir. 
Bawden has testified? 
l\fr. Snedden: Exactly, sir. Yes, sir." 
It would appear that the next logical question is 
whether or not the injury is the result of an accidPnt 
arising out of or in the course of his employml•nt, which 
the Commission so found. 
The uncontradicted record shows that Mr. Bawden 
after having assisted truck driver Gary Scott get mer-
chandise loaded for delivery went back into the ware-
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house of the Hinds' Company to get some merchandise. 
Because of the manner in which the merchandise was 
:;tacked, the space between the rows of merchandise and 
the necessity to see the label on the bottom box, resting 
on the floor, .Mr. Bawden assumed a gradual crouching 
position as he read down the labels. When he had 
a::;smned a crouched position to the limits of his physical 
capacity, it was necessary to protrude his head in a 
downward manner in a space less than three feet, to 
view the bottom label. (R. 30-31). At this point he felt 
pain in his knee and he was unable to straighten out 
his leg. (R. 31). He hobbled about on one leg for a 
while hoping it would straighten out. (R. 32). The leg 
did riot and with the aid of a broomstick as a cane, he 
was able to move about. His merchandise was loaded on 
his wagon by others and he made two deliveries. (R. 32). 
The occurrence of the injury on the premises was 
known by others, Mr. Smith, 'l'ruck driver Gary Scott, 
Salesman Victor Sismonde, and Mrs. Halford, all em-
ployees of Merle Hinds Company, Inc. (R. 32). Mr. 
Bawden thinks l\Ir. and l\Irs. Snedden were there on 
Friday, April 30, 1965, and aware of the injury. Mr. 
Snedden instructed him to have the knee looked at. 
(R. 33). 
Mrs. Halford expressed doubt that Mr. and Mrs. 
Snedden were there on Friday, but her memory is ad-
mittedly vague. (R. 82). She admits talking to Mr. Baw-
den on Friday, April 30, 1965, but thinks it was Monday, 
May 3, 1965, when he really discussed it. (R. 82). As 
to a request to file an accident report Mrs. Halford 
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indicates that she didn't think he requested it, but slw 
thought she said she would. (R. 82). She does remember 
going down the hall for a file sheet that goes to the 
Industrial Commission. (R. 83). 
There seems to be no doubt that an injury occurred 
as alleged on April 30, 1965. l\Ir. Bawden was seen at 
the Memorial Medical Clinic by Dr. Jenkins that day 
and their records show that his right knee was x-rayed 
and a report of the x-ray was made by E. Paul Isgreen, 
1\1. D. (R 8-Top of page). 
No issue was raised or concern expressed by any-
one until the lack of \Vorkmen's Compensation cov-
erage was discovered. l\Ir. Bawden had reported to 
Memorial Medical Clinic that his knee had "slipped out" 
at work. (R. 8-Top; R. 3; R. 151). It appears that the 
lack of coverage was probably discovered when Memorial 
l\Iedical Clinic called Mrs. Halford and wanted to know 
who carried Hinds' .. Workmen's Compensation. ( R. 80). 
Mrs. Halford told her the State Insurance Fund. (R. SO). 
When the lady from Memorial l\Iedical Clinic called back 
either two or three days or the next day later she in-
formed Mrs. Halford the State Fund had no record of 
insurance on Merle Hinds Company, Inc. (R. 80). 
With this discovery there were many calls and dis-
cussions to find out why there was no coverage. (R. 86). 
But, in order to alleviate this difficulty, by the testi-
mony of l\Ir. Snedden (R. 74--75), the relucant testimony 
of Mrs. Halford (R. 8G-87), and the testimony of l\lr. 
Bawden (R. 37-38), Mr. Ba\\·den was instructed by l\1r. 
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Snedden to change the claim to one under Blue Cross -
Blue Shield, whicl1 he did. Mr. Snedden also made inquiry 
of Mrs. Bawden relative to the change of claim to Blue 
Cross - Blue Shield. (R. 47). It is submitted that the 
reason for any conflicting statements made by Mr. Baw-
den were at the instigation, direction and control of Mr. 
Snedden. 
During, and at the close of the hearing, as is set 
forth in plaintiff's brief, (P. 4), there were two main 
tt>sues: 
First: Whether or not there was an accident, and 
collaterally the question of medical causa-
tion or lack of medical causation. ( R. 45). 
Second: The issue of insurance coverage. ( R. 100). 
Plaintiff also wondered whether or not there was to 
be a preliminary hearing on the question of an accident. 
lt is submitted that this was the purpose of the hearing 
just completed. 
Pursuant to the provisions of 35-1-77, U.C.A. 1953, 
the medical aspects were ref erred to a medical panel, 
(R. 100), appointed by the C01mnission. (R. 156). The 
panel, with the addition of an internist (R. 157, 158), 
performed its statutory function and made its report 
in writing to the Commission October 27, 1966. (R. 160-
164). Copies of the panel report were mailed by the 
Commission to all parties and their attorneys on October 
27, 1966, by Certified Mail, return receipt requested, 
together with a cover letter notifying all parties they 
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had fifteen days within \\·hich to file \Hittc·11 objections 
to the report. (R. 165-166). 
No objections were filed by any party or attorney. 
Pursuant to the provisions of 35-1-11, U.C.A. l!J53: 
"If no objections are so filed \\·ithin such lH'l'iod, 
the report shall be d<'Pllled adrnittPd in evidmc·<· 
and the Commission way base its findin~ and 
decision on the report of th<· panel, hut shall not 
be bound by such report if there is other sub-
stantial conflicting evidPnce in thP cast' whieh 
supports a contrary finding by the Commission." 
The Comission followed the rnandat<• of tlw statnt<~ and 
set forth in its findings: ''The l\ledical Panel Heport 
is therefore deemed in evidence'." (H. 161). 
In its Findings of Fact, the Commissio11 :ods forth 
two issues: 
"FINDINGS OF FAcrr: 
Two primary and one seeondary iss1w app<•arPd to 
be involved in the hearing, namely: ( 1) \YltdliN 
or not the Defendant, .Merl0 Hinds Company, 
had a policy of workmen's eompensation insur-
ance in effect at the time of the aeeident, April 
30, 1965, and (2) 'Yhether or not an acC'ident 
occurred in the course of the Applicant's <'lllJ>lo:·-
ment on this datP, and 8econdarily, what was th<· 
medical result if such an accident O('('UlTt>cl." (R. 
167). 
The Commission then found that tht>re was no "' ork-
men's Compensation insuranP<' in effect on the date of 
the alleged accident, April 30, 1965. Thl' Commissioll 
then found: 
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"With resvect to issue number :2, the Hearing 
Examiner finds that the Apvlicant, on the date 
in question, \ms engaged in activities unusual to 
him; i.e., assisting in getting out an order. In so 
doing, it required that he crouch low on his 
haunches in order to examine a low stocked row 
of merchandise. Such an unusual position created 
an unusual strain on the knee, which in turn cre-
ated a split knee cartilage. 
It is evident that all employees of the Defendant, 
Merle Hinds Company, vvere well aware of its 
occurrence and the severe nature of the injury. 
The Applicant did not return to work after the 
. 30th of April. 
Surgery was performed to repair the split knee 
cartilage, i.e., meniscectomy. A day and half fol-
lowing his discharge from the hospital, the Appli-
cant became ill, was returnPd to the hospital, and 
after a lengthy and stormy hospital stay was fi-
nally released." (R. 167). 
Plaintiff chooses to ignore the foregoing language, 
"Applicant ... was engaged in activities unusu.al to him; 
i.e., assisting in getting out an order .... Such an unusiUJ,l 
position created a~z unusual strain on the knee, which 
m turn created a split knee cartilage." (emphasis ours) 
This is the "injury" for which compensation is pro-
vided by 35-1-45, U.C.A. 1953. 
Plaintiff's argmnent that it must result from an 
identifiable accident or accidents in the course of em-
ployments raises the correct issue, but fails to define 
what is meant by the term, ''accident." 
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Pintar v. Industrial Commission, 14 Utah 2d 27G, 
382 P.2d 41-± (1963) talks of an accident or aceident8 but 
' does not define the term. 
Carling v. Industrial Commission, lG Utah 2d 2GO, 39!:) 
P.2d 202 ( 1965) will place the term in its proper per-
spective wherein at page 202, and 204, it is stated: 
"The W ork:men's Compensation Act, Section 35-1-
45, U.C.A. 1953, provides for an award to an 
employee" * * * who is injured * * * by accide11t 
arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment * * *." There is no further definition of 
the term "accident," but this court has held that 
for the purpose of the Act it should he given 
a broad meaning. It connotes an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from what \Vould 
normally be expected to occur in the usual eoun;e 
of events." 
The principle enun1erated in Carling is not new or novd 
to this jurisdiction as is illustrated by the cases cited 
in Carling and in particular Graybar Electric Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 73 Utah 568, 276 P. lGl (1929). 
Certainly the finding of the Commission above 
quoted is on all fours with the definition of an "accident" 
without the use of the term. It \Vas the unusual work, 
the unusual position creating an unusual strain on the 
knee which produced the split knee cartilage, thi8 cPl'-
tainly was an unanticipated, unintended occurrence dif-
ferent from what would normally be expected to occur 
in the usual course of events. This is the Commission's 
finding, not the rnedieal panels'. 
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ln the next portion the Commission adopts the med-
i(·al panel't:> findings as to the medical caut:>ation. Here 
the magic word accident appears and Plaintiff would 
have this Court believe that the Commission has abro-
gated its t:>tatutory function. This contention is thoroughly 
ant:>wered by this Court in the recent case of Daniel R. 
:1lellrn v. /ll(l1tstrial Commission of Utah, et al, decided 
August 2-!, 1967, and presently unreported. We quote 
the case as follows : 
"'rlie plaintiff's main theme is that the Commis-
sion adopted the panel report which, it is urged, 
was a misstatement of the law. Counsel says: 
'The denial of plaintiff's claim by the Medical 
Panel is based on incorrect interpretations of law 
by the Panel and is contrary to the undisputed 
evidence.' 
In the first place, the panel did not nor could 
not deny the claim, - the function of the Com-
mission. 
The other answer to this contention is that in 
giving the panel the duty of analyzing this case, 
the Commission in a letter appointing the panel 
carefully said: "The Panel has no jurisdiction 
to make a finding on the occurrence of an acci-
dent. Therefore, in the Panel Report just pre-
ceding the findings and conclusions, the following 
language should be used : 'Assuming but not de-
ciding that applicant had an accident as alleged 
the Panel finds, etc.' It is thus obvious that the 
Commission, in adopting the report, did not adopt 
anv conclusions of law of the Panel if there were 
an)r, bnt onl.v the medical facts and conclusions 
drawn." 
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The Bawden panel was operating under the same 
set of instructions. (R. 156). We submit that the Com-
mission properly made its findings of fact and condu-
sions of law and they are am1Jly suprwrted by substantial, 
competent, uncontradicted evidence. 
POINT II. 
HAROLD BAWDEN WAS AN EMPLOYEE OF MERLE 
HINDS COMPANY, INC., NOT AN INDEPENDENT CON-
TRACTOR. 
This issue has been interjected into this case on 
appeal and was never before the Industrial Connnis::;ion. 
On March 1, 1967 plaintiff timely filed a Petition for 
Review of the Industrial Commission's award in this 
case. (R. 171-172). No claim was made at this time that 
Harold Bawden was an independent contractor. 'rhe 
petition for review was denied by a Commission Order 
dated March 16, 1967. (R. 172-A). 
On March 29, 1967, plaintiff filed, out of time (See 
35-1-82.55 U.C.A. 1953), a second Petition for Review. 
(R. 173-179). This was denied by Conunission Order 
dated April 6, 1967. (R. 180). This was the first asser-
tion on the part of the plaintiff that Harold Bawden 
had been considered anything but an employee of .Merle 
Hinds Company, Inc. Plaintiff then timely filed its Peti-
tion for a Writ of Review in this court on Aprl 12, 19G7. 
(R. 181-185). 
Pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Indus-
trial Commission, adopted and approved April 15, 1966, 
by Motion 23850, and in effect at the time of the hearing 
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of thil::l matter and based upon recogni11ed principlel::l of 
practice, the plaintiff should be precluded from al::lserting 
thil::l affirmative defense on appeal. 
Although the Industrial Comrnisl::lion rules took effect 
after the filing of Harold Bawden'l::l applieation and 
Merle Hinds Company, Inc., denial thereof, the applicant 
i;.; entitled to some notice of affirmative defenses. Rule 
G ( e) of the lndul::ltrial Co111111il::lsion in eff eet on the date 
of the hearing provides : 
'' ( c) The ani::\wer must include all affirmative 
defenses intended to be used by the insurance 
carrier. If such affirmative defense is not in-
cluded in the airnwer filed, the insurance carrier 
will be precluded from using it at the time of the 
hearing nnl.ess good cause can be shown as to why 
it was not so included. Affirmative def ens es must 
be written with sufficient accuracy and detail 
that the applicant may be fully informed of the 
nature of the defense.'' 
To permit the raising of this issue on appeal is 
unconscionable. 
However, it is not conceded that the evidence shows 
the existence of an independent contractor relationship. 
On the contrary, taking the evidence in the light most 
favorable to upholding the award, it is apparent that at 
the hearing Merle Hinds Company, Inc., admitted the 
existence of the employee-employer relationship. 
It would appear that five out of st-ven witnesses were 
wlled for the purposp of establishing the existence or 
non-existence of a Workmen's Compensation policy. (R 
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20). That Merle Hinds Company, Inc., intended to cover 
Harold Bawden as an employee can't be argued. 'l'hl• 
injury was going to be reported by Mrs. Halford (R 83), 
to the Industrial Commission as an "industrial accident." 
The State Insurance Fund was given as the carrier. 
(R. 30). No alarm or concern was raised until it became 
apparent that there was some doubt as to coverage. 
(R. 86). Then the shift to Blue Cross - Blue Shield. (R. 
38). 
On direct examination James K. Snedden states that 
he is the owner and president of Merle Hinds Company, 
Inc., operating as a corporation. (R. 67). He was asked 
by Mr. Mock: (R. 83). 
"Q. l\Ir. Snedden, did your company carry 
any Blue Cross - Blue Shield for employees? 
A. Yes, we did. Shortly after procuring the 
company they had Blue Cross in effect, and I 
agreed with my wife - who is a director - to 
carry Blue Cross and Blue Shield for our em-
ployees, and pay the full amount. 
Q. Was the full payment made by Merle 
Hinds Company~ 
A. Yes." 
Further questions by .Mr. .Mock to .Mr. Snedden: 
(R. 71). 
"Q. What other policies do you carry for 
your employees, besides the Blue Cross - Blue 
Shield~ That is at the time of this incident? 
A. That is all, sir. Well, I thought I was 
covered with all accidents of all types, and indus-
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trial accidenh;. Because I had been in the past, 
I assumed I was at he prl'sent. I was so given the 
understanding. 
Q. Are you aequainted with a company called 
the Utah 'l'ravelers - Let's see. What i;,.; it. 
U.T.C.? 
A. Cnited Corn11H•reial Travelers Insurance 
Company. Ye;,.;, I am. l'm a member, sir. 
Q. Does this carry any coverage for any 
of your employees? 
A. Yes, it does. All our employees are cov-
ered under that policy. 
Q. Do you recall whether any claims were 
filed, on behalf of Mr. Bawden, under that policy? 
A. I do. I helped him prepare a claim." 
lt dot>;,.; seem somewhat inconsistent to develop a 
long line of evidence covering vVorkmen's Compensation 
coverage for all employees, Blue Cross - Blue Shield for 
all employees, including paying the premium, United 
Conmwrcial Travelern Insurance Company for all em-
ployees, include Harold Bawden in all insurance that is 
in force, then on appeal contend he is an independent 
contractor. It must be conceded that l\Ierle Hinds, Inc., 
admitted the employee-employer relationship at hearing 
and should now be estopped to deny it. 
Some light may be shed upon the intent of l\Ierle 
Hinds Company, Inc., by reference to the W'"orkmen's 
Compensation Policy issued by lTnited States Fidelity 
and Guaranty and inadvertently cancelled. (R. 103). The 
policy provides coverage for: 
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"Store Risks-Wholesale, or combined wholesale 
retail N.O.C. 
Salesmen, collector or messengers - Outside." 
(R. 103). 
Which again illustrates the intent of .Merle Hinds 
Company, Inc., to provide Workmen's Compensation In-
surance coverage for all of its employees. Its president-
owner, at the time of the injury and during the hearing 
as well as company's counsel during the hearing categor-
ized Harold Bawden in the class of an employee and 
not as an independent contractor. 
Taking the evidence as it now stands, it is defendant' Ii 
position that the Plaintiff in asserting an affirmative 
defense has the burden of proof on the issue and the 
evidence will not sustain a finding that Mr. Bawden was 
an independent contractor. 
In support of the Plaintiff's contention, the court's 
attention is directed to Stover Bedding Co. v. bulustrial 
Commission, 99 Utah 423, 107 P.2d 1027, where this ques-
tion was timely raised, evidence was thoroughly adduced 
at commission hearing and this court held that the appli-
cant was an independent contractor. 
Plaintiff points to some similarities between Mr. 
Bawden's employment and that of Mr. Knudson, the 
deceased applicant in Stover. 
1. Both were commission salesmen. 
2. Both solicited orders on there own initiative 
and discretion. 
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::l. I ~oth used their own automobile for which 
they were not compensated. (Plaintiff's Brief 
- p. 3). 
Defendants submit that the record will only support 
that Mr. Bawdm became an employee of Merle Hinds 
Company, Inc., in September, 1965. (R. 28). That he 
\ms hin·d as a salesman, to solicit orders from the trade 
for .Merle Hinds which is a distributor of food products 
generally. (R. 28). 
As a salesman he solicited orders from bakers, candy 
makers, ice cream makers, clubs and grocery stores. 
(R 28-29). He was not furnished a car and used his 
own. (R. 29). He made deliveries, (R. 33) and was 
employed as an outside salesman on a commission basis. 
(R. 38). 
The record is silent as to: 
1. Use of own initiative and at his own discre-
tion. 
2. Whether he was compensated for the use 
of his automobile. 
In citing the excerpt from Stover Bedding case as 
precedent for this case plaintiff glosses over the fact that 
there is no evidence as to: (Plaintiff's Brief - P. 5). 
1.. Written Contract, 
2. Limits of Territory, 
3. Instructions as to conduct of work, 
4. Payment of expenses, 
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5. Trips to be made and when he should make 
them, 
6. Control or right to control. 
Hence, it would appear that any person employed 
as an outside salesman who uses his own car is an inde-
pendent contractor. 
Also glossed over by reference to the Stover Bedding 
case is the fact that: 
1. Knudson, the deceased, was a salesman for 
Stover Bedding Co., and Smith and Davis 
Company simultaneously. 
2. The accident occurred on a sales trip in 
Idaho and not on the employer's premises. 
3. The only work deceased did at the factory 
was in relation to sales promotion and here 
the injury occurred in the course of filling 
a merchandise order which Bawden deliv-
erecl. 
Without belaboring the point further, it is submitted 
there isn't sufficient evidence to support the affirmative 
defense of independent contractor. Particularly in view 
of the state of the record where it is so obvious that 
during the hearing Plaintiff, by its president-owner by 
answer and counsel, by the form of question, 'vere treat-
ing Harold Bawden as an employee and hoping to escape 
liability by showing that the injury did not occur as the 
result of a "definable accident." 
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'l'his court in Christean, et al, v. Industrial Co1nmis-
siu11, ct al, 113 Utah -151 l9G P.:2d 50:2, (19-18) approved 
the variom; tests for determining the relaionship of 
servant and independent contractor as are set forth in 
the Hestatement of Agency, Par. 2:20, page 483. The 
court again approves the various tests set forth in the 
Restatement of Agency in Larry Nicholson v. Industrial 
Commission, ct al, 1-1 Utah 2d 3, 376 P.2d 38G, (1962). 
Both of these <"ases were presl•nted to the Industrial 
Commission and this court on the issue of independent 
contractor relationship. Both of these cases involved 
written contracts of employment and although the re-
sults reached in each case were different, the conunission 
and the court were afforded the opportunity of applying 
the law to the facts. 
In the case of Sutton v. hidu.strial Commission of 
[,'tah, 9 Utah 2d 399, 34-1 P.2d 538, (1959) this court 
reviewed a case in which the defense of independent con-
tractor was raised, not based upon a written agreement. 
Again the issue was asserted in the commission hearing 
and the court summarized the problem at pages 539, 540, 
as follows: 
''The distinction beween the relationship of em-
ployer - emploype in which the employee has 
various advantages, including workmen's compen-
sation, as contrasted with the independent con-
tractor status, in which lw does not have those 
advantages, has been a constant subject of con-
troversv and has been dt>alt with in numerous 
cases b.y this court. The conditions of employ-
ment ar·e so various that it has proved difficult to 
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formulate a definition setting forth specific fac-
tors which will invariably apply as an exclu::;ive 
definition of the employer-employee relationship 
as distinguished from the status of indqJendent 
contractor. Generally spe.aking, an employee i" 
one who is hired and paid at a given rate to do 
work that is part of the trade or business of the 
employer, and is subject to constant supe1-i-ision 
and contrnl in performing his duties; u·hereas the 
independent contractor is engaged to do a particu-
lar job or piece of work for ·a set sum and is nut 
sUbject for its completion." (Emphasis ours) 
We submit that present record supports only the 
finding of a normal employer-employee arrangement for 
the following reasons : 
1. The clear intent of the l\ferle Hinds Com-
pany, Inc., as expressed by the conduct of 
its president-owner, l\fr. Snedden in setting 
up his insurance coverage in three areas was 
to cover all employees and it was his intent 
to cover l\fr. Bawden as an employee. 
2. The testimony adduced at the hearing, in-
cluding the use of the word employee, by 
counsel for the plaintiff, defendant, :Mr. Baw-
den and Mr. Snedden is only compatible 
with the proposition that all of the parties 
and their counsel were treating the arrange-
ment as that of employer and employee. 
3. That the lack of testimony relating to right 
of control, distinct occupation or business, 
kind of occupation, ie., specialist or gen-
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eralist, ;-;kill, tools and place of work, length 
of time, metl10<l of payment, part of the regu-
lar business, whether or not the parties be-
lieve the relation::;hip is that of master and 
servant a::; set forth in the Restatement of 
Agency, ~:2:20, page ±80 and the decisions 
of this court, i::; due to the fact that there 
wa::; nu issue on this point and all parties 
an<l their counsel heliend the relationship 
was that of master and servant. 
±. That the burden of asserting and proving 
the affirmative defense of an independent 
contrac·tor relationship is on the Plaintiff 
.Jfrrle Hincls Company, lne., which it failed 
to do. 
5. That on the record the Industrial Commis-
sion could only conclude that the relation-
ship \ms that of employer and employee. 
POIXT III. 
THE IXDl:STRIAL Co:JL\IISSIOX APPLIED THE SA.ME 
::'TAXDARD TO THIS XOX-COYERAGE CASE AS THEY 
DO TO A COYERAGE CASE. 
Plaintiff cites the Industrial Commission case of 
foil Jfor ff. Daci!'i c. KC1T, /11c., and the State lnsnr-
'lilCl Fi111(l. C/.ai111 Xo. Gl-±7 \R. ljj) in support of the 
]1rupo:::ition that Harold Bawden did not have an "acci-
d1,nt .. since '"a1iplieant lifted no weight. He did not slip 
in fall. The cable incidt>nt required no unusual exertion." 
Thl' L"ase fa lb upon its o\nl wording. \Ye direct the 
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court's attention to the fact that the Davis incident re-
quired no wnusual exertion. The Conunission clearly 
found that, Mr. Bawden "was engaged in adivitiPs 1111-
usual to him; i. e., assising in getting out an order. In 
so doing, it required that he crouch low on his haunches 
in order to examine a low stocked row of merchandise. 
Such unusiwl position created an unusual strain on the 
knee which in turn created a split knee cartilage." (R. 
167) (Emphasis ours) 
We submit that this is an injury by accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the Industrial Commission has not 
acted without or in excess of its powers, and that its 
findings of fact based upon competent credible evidence 
fully support the award and should be sustained and 
af finned by this court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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